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ABSTRACT
The goal of risk analysis is to identify events that may
have one or several undesirable consequences on a
system, and to assess the likelihood and severity of
these consequences. A lot of methods may be used
to conduct risk analysis such as Preliminary Hazard
Analysis (PHA), and Failure Mode Effects Analysis
(FMEA). In most of these methods, the obtained in-
formation may be used to build a risk model.
Very often, the next step after risk analysis is, to
study the behavior of the system if the undesirable
events occur, in order to evaluate its performance in
degraded conditions and its robustness or resilience.
An approach allowing integrated risk analysis and
simulation would be desirable. Such an approach
has been proposed for business process management
[Tjoa et al., 2011].
The goal of this paper is to present a meta model,
suited to socio-technical systems, that allows describ-
ing the system to analyze, the result of the risk analy-
sis and the required aspects of dynamical system be-
havior in order automatically perform simulation un-
der degraded conditions. The model is an extension
of the FIS model presented in [Negrichi et al., 2012].
The meta model may also be used for fault diagnosis
as it can be used for generating redundancy relation
and performing root cause search [Flaus et al., 2011].
Our meta model consists of three main modules:
the structural view, the dysfunctional view and the
view of the evolution.:
• The structural view (SysFis): defines the archi-
tecture of the analyzed system, breaks it down
into subsystems, and describes the characteris-
tics of each subsystem and the material entities
used. This is the basic view. that describes the
structure of the installation or the analyzed ob-
ject in a relatively simple manner, by showing
the various interactions systems, and specifying,
if necessary their functions and the material com-
ponents (human, technical or informational) that
compose them. This part also allows describing
links between these elements. The purpose of
this view is to provide a frame structure for the
dysfunctional or behavioral view.
• The dysfunctional view (DysFis): is built when
we realize the risk analysis, It is used for describ-
ing the risk analysis or malfunction. This analy-
sis consists in identify, for each element of a sys-
tem, states in which this element may result in an
injury, or be unable to respond to requirements
specified with the expected level of performance.
• The view of the evolution (SimFis):
describes the behavior of the system in normal or
degraded mode. It describes the dynamic behav-
ior of the system. It is not necessary to construct
this view to perform a simple risk analysis kind,
or even to build a fault tree or a bow tie diagram.
However, when we have this view, it is possible
to simulate the operation of the system, includ-
ing degraded mode. In addition, some elements
of this view can be exploited for diagnostic or
prognostic. The dynamical behavior of the sys-
tem is described using:
– a BPMN model for representing the se-
quence of activities,
– an input/output processor model, with sev-
eral possible configurations for model-
ing the flow transformation [Flaus, 2013,
Karagiannis et al., 2010].
This model view is related to the structural and dys-
functional model obtained from risk analysis, allow-
ing the generation of the simulation model based on
the risk model. We are used this meta model to ana-
lyze the risk related to the transportation of dangerous
goods by road, and we are detailed the loading func-
tion of this materials in a truck.
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ABSTRACT:
This document represents an overview of the Function Interaction Structure (FIS) modeling,
where the goal is to represent a system and the risk analysis that is made, and to obtain a
simulation model from the risk analysis. This model is able to show the results of risk analysis.
This model is supplemented by information on its behavior, in order to generate the dynamic
model in degraded mode. Our proposed meta model is also used to analyze the risk associated
with a system such as: evacuation system, transport of dangerous goods, ...
1 INTRODUCTION
The goal of risk analysis is to identify events
that may have one or several undesirable con-
sequences on a system, and to assess the like-
lihood and severity of these consequences. A
lot of methods can be used to conduct risk
analysis (Flaus, 2013a) such as Preliminary
Hazard Analysis (PHA) and Failure Mode Ef-
fects Analysis (FMEA)(Papadopoulos et al.,
2004). In most of these methods, the ob-
tained information may be used to build a risk
model.The next step after risk analysis is to
study the behavior of the system, when the
undesirable events occur, in order to evaluate
its performance in degraded conditions, and
its robustness or resilience. An approach to
allow integrated risk analysis and simulation
has been proposed for business process man-
agement (Tjoa et al., 2011).
The aim of this paper is to present a meta
model, suitable to socio-technical systems.
This model allows describing the system to
analyze, the result of the risk analysis, and the
required aspects of dynamical system behav-
ior, in order to automatically perform simu-
lation under degraded conditions. The model
is an extension of the FIS model presented in
(Flaus, 2011, Negrichi et al., 2012). The meta
model may also be used for fault diagnosis, as
it can be used to generate redundancy relation
and to perform root cause search (Flaus et al.,
2011).
The remainder of this paper is organized
as follows. Section 2 represents the first part
of the FIS model, defines the architecture of
the analyzed system, and describes the char-
acteristics the system and the material enti-
ties used. This is the basic view. Section 3
represents the second part of the FIS model.
It is built when we realize the risk analysis
(Karagiannis et al., 2010). Section 4 displays
the last part of the FIS model. It is assembled
when we describe the behavior of the system
in normal or degraded mode. An illustration
of this method on transporting hazardous ma-
terial by road is presented and discussed in
Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes this
paper.
2 SYSFIS VIEW
This part describes the structure of the equip-
ment or the analyzed object, in a relatively
simple manner by showing the various sys-
tems interactions, and specifying, if necessary
their functions and the material components
(human, technical or informational) that com-
pose them (see Figure 1). This part also al-
lows describing the links between these ele-
ments. The purpose of this view is to provide
a frame structure for the dysfunctional or for
behavioral view (Flaus, 2008).
Figure 1: SysFis Model
2.1 Elements of the model
The basic element of the representation is the
process or system, composed of functions,
physical resources and input/output ports. A
process or system is seen as an organized set
of activities that uses resources (personnel,
device, equipment and machinery, raw mate-
rial and information) to transform inputs into
output elements. Each process or system is
described internally by:
• The structural elements (SE), known
as resources or entities, which con-
sist of hardware (machinery and mate-
rials), informational, human and organi-
zational activities to conduct the process
activities. We distinguish machines, ma-
terials and processed parts, human ac-
tors, methods represented by procedures,
software, The physical context charac-
terized by variables such as temperature,
the concentration of various products,
the noise level ...
• The functional elements (FE), called
functions or system activities, are de-
fined as the role played by a set of re-
sources in terms of purpose. It is a kind
of dematerialization of a set of entities
specifying what the system can do. This
represents a specification of the system
behavior. A function can be active or not
active at a given time. Its behavior is
characterized by a set of variables, and
eventually by a performance model de-
scribing the temporal evolution.
It is possible to define for each system a
structural element and a main functional
components. A system is decomposed of sub-
systems, which themselves can be described
by structural elements and/or functional
components.
The advantages of this model for risk anal-
ysis are:
• on the one hand: it allows a descrip-
tion of the installation or the object an-
alyzed, in an organized and hierarchical
way. This description may be systemic,
functional or structural where the differ-
ent parts of the model are managed si-
multaneously.
• and on the other hand, it helps at the
identification of risks, based on the cat-
egory of the different elements of the
model. For example, a risk of explosion
types can be identified for the element
"gas pressure".
Note: When modeling a complex reality, it is
necessary to decompose it in several systems,
and eventually subsystems.
2.2 Links between model elements
Relationships may be defined between the
structural and functional elements of the
model (Figure 2). To perform a function or
activity :
• a number of incoming items may be nec-
essary, they are consumed or brought us-
ing information, there are "inputs" for
the function. This is the case of a raw
material, a part to be assembled or a sen-
sor;
• other elements are generated where there
state is modified, resources are then
"outputs" for the function. This is the
case of a material produced from an as-
sembled or machined object;
• finally, some structural elements may
be used, they are "supports" for the func-
tion. For example, this is the case of a
machine or an operator used to perform
a function.
When the links are given at the systems level,
they represent a broader point of view, be-
cause they do not detail the relationships
within a system. Links between elements of
the model may contain information, such as
coefficients or properties.
Figure 2: Relations
Remark. Resources include both items that
are processed, items products and compo-
nents used for processing. The terminology
used in the context of flow simulation, is to
call entity, produced and consumed resources
and resources, used ressources.
2.3 Details of model elements
Before describing in detail the elements of the
model, we may define:
• A variable, which corresponds to a
magnitude that can be represented by an
integer, a real, ...
• An attribute, that can de-
scribe any property given by:
a =< name, value >, where value
is any value representable by a struc-
tured string character following the
ECMA-404 JSON Data Interchange
Standard syntax.
A variable can be used to evaluate system
behavior, values are the possible values of a
state variable of a hybrid dynamical system.
An attribute is of a different nature. Its aim is
Figure 3: Events Graph
to represent one of the properties of a meta el-
ement. Its values can be generally represented
by an object, the chosen format is JSON.
Formally, a structural view of a model is
defined by M =< S,L > where :
• S is a set of systems, S =
{si|0 ≤ i ≤ n} with s =<
F (s),R(s), Sub(s), V (s),A(s) > is
a system defined by a set of functions F ,
a set of resources R, a set of subsystems
Sub, a set of variables V (s) and a set of
attributes A(s).
• L is a set of links de-
fined as follows L =<
mes,met, nature, A(l), nature, direction, Ms×
Mt >
A model element, me may be a system, a
functional element or a structural element.
The set of model elements connected to a
model element is denoted by Ns(me).
Remark. The function O(x) defines the
owner(s) of x. This function is denied for vari-
ables O(v), attributesO(a), functions, struc-
tural element O(r), ...
3 DYSFIS VIEW
3.1 Elements of the model
The dysfunctional view (Figure 3) is used to
describe the risk analysis or malfunction. This
analysis consists in identifying, for each ele-
ment of a system, states in which this element
may cause a damage, or might be unable to
answer correctly with the expected level of
performance. The principle of this analysis
with the view DysFis is as follows:
• each fact that may occur is represented
by an event;
• the nature of the fact is described by
the type of events: there are such events
characterizing hazards, failure modes or
deviations of variables;
• each event is associated with the element
of the model view SysFIS to which is re-
lated. For example, a failure mode can be
associated with a given resource;
• the causal links between events can de-
scribe the sequence of malfunctions. It is
possible to associate properties to these
links and barriers that affect the propa-
gation.
The list of event types proposed by the
model is the following: events represent-
ing the degraded dangerous phenomena (dp),
events representing the failure modes (fm),
events representing the deviations of vari-
ables (vdev), events representing degrada-
tion events (dam), intermediate events (gen),
events characterizing the hazardous situations
(hs), central unwanted events characterizing
the loss of control (uce).
Each event is associated with a Boolean
value. For a model element, the OK mode is
defined as true if no event model dysfunction
is true.
3.2 Links between model elements
Events are related to each other by links rep-
resenting causal relationships: the causes of
an event are connected to the input of the
resulting event. Different types of connec-
tors exist, such as AND and OR connectors.
Links between events may occur with a cer-
tain probability, in particular an influence co-
efficient. Each link may relate to the input or
the output of an event a barrier characterized
by a reduction coefficient of the likelihood or
severity.
The events are connected depending on the
causal links. The model allows then to gen-
erate the fault tree relating to an event. Fur-
thermore, the links between events can be
weighted and it is possible to associate them
with security gates.
3.3 Details of model elements
Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between
the views SysFis and DysFis: events are asso-
ciated with different elements. Links between
the elements of SysFis model can guide the
analysis of the propagation of dysfunctions
for causal links between events.
Formally, the dysfunctional view is de-
fined by a set of events E = {ei}, and a
graph G. The events are defined as e =<
N,P (e), S(e),O(e), g, µ, ν,A(e), V (e) >
where
• N is the set of the nature
of events. Most often, N ⊂
{dp, fm, vdev,hs, uce, dam,gen};
• P (e) and S(e) are sets of predecessors
and successors of the event;
• O(e) is the owner of event;
• gi(e) is the input gate;
• µ is a function that defines the likelihood
of the event, and v is the severity of the
event.
The event graph G is defined with the sets
P (e) and S(e) for each event; ρ(ei, ej) is
a partially defined function which describes
a weight related to the edge between two
events; M(ei, ej) a partially defined function
which associates modifiers to the relation be-
tween ei and ej . An example of modifier is
a safety barrier. The failure mode of a model
element is denoted by fmodei (failuremode).
The normal of a model element is defined as :
ok =
∧
i
qdfmodei
Figure 4: Links between system element , function, re-
sources and events
4 SIMFIS VIEW
The SimFis view describes the dynamic be-
havior of the system. It is not necessary to
construct this view to perform a simple risk
analysis or even to build a fault tree or node
bow tie diagram. However, when we have this
view, it is possible to simulate the operation
of the system, including degraded mode. In
addition, some elements of this view can be
exploited for diagnostic or prognostic (Flaus,
2013b, Giap et al., 2009).
Figure 5: Process
Figure 6: Activity diagram
The behavior is described by several
complementary aspects. Each model ele-
ment (System, Functional element or
Structural element), which is desired to de-
scribe the evolution, has one or more behav-
ior modes. Usually, at least one mode of be-
havior is defined for the OK mode of , and
a mode of behavior is associated with each
failure mode that could be interesting to sim-
ulate. A model element may be active or inac-
tive, which means that it is not used in a given
configuration.
At each mode of behavior is associated
with one or more activities, which can be of
the following types:
• a simple modification activity of the in-
formational state, described by a math-
ematical relationship and an execution
duration (may be null);
• an activity of transformation element,
which can be seen as an entity proces-
sor (Figure 5) and used to represent the
flow diagrams of processing: a System,
a Functional element or a Structural
element can be seen as a processor
which transforms into output, member
elements, or that performs actions on el-
ements. A processor can be active or not;
• a macro-type activity described by a di-
agram of subset of BPMN Type (Figure
6).
When an element becomes active for a given
mode, the corresponding activities to this
mode become active and can describe the be-
havior of this element. When it changes its
operation mode, i.e from a normal mode OK
to a dysfunctional mode DM1, the current ac-
tivity is interrupted and the dynamic behav-
ior changes. More precisely, a simple activ-
ity is defined by a =< name, x← fa(x), δ >
where x is a vector of variables defined in the
model element or the set of model elements
via a structural link Ns(me), and δ is a posi-
tive integer representing the time t = δ.Ts.
A transformation activity is defined by:
• a transformation relation defined as fol-
low:
∑
nimei|φi..→
nsmes|φs
−→
∑
nomeo|φo{mi}
where mei is an input model element, re-
quired in number ni and which must sat-
isfy the condition φ, which a logical re-
lation expressed with respect to the vari-
ables, the attributes and the events avail-
able in the scope. meo is an output and
mes is a model element representing a
support;
• a positive integer duration δ representing
the time t = δ.Ts, and/or a set of final
conditions;
• a priority p;
• a set of input actions defined as mathe-
matical relation on variables in the scope
{me} ∪Ns(me).
xc(k)← finput(xc(k))∪ {mi};
Figure 7: Activity diagram
• a set of output actions defined in a simi-
lar way
xc(k)← fourtput(xc(k))∪ {mi};
• a set of evolution equations, computed at
each sampling time
xc(k+ 1) = f(xc(k))∪ {mi}.
This set of elements allows to model the sys-
tem behavior as follows:
1. A model element, when it is active,
evolves according to the diagram in Fig-
ure 7:
(a) block 1 is activated : this step con-
sists of searching input elements
satisfying the conditions in ade-
quate numbers. If all items are not
available, the block 1 is still active;
(b) else, block 2 becomes active. The
input actions are performed;
(c) block 3 becomes active and evolu-
tion calculation is performed, if the
equations are defined;
(d) while the execution time mode is
less then max time and the final
condition is false, the block will be
executed;
(e) the final actions are executed, the
inputs are destroyed and the sup-
port and outputs are released.
Remark. • An operating mode can be de-
fined for each phase of life in OK mode,
phases of life taking values in the set
OM : NormalOperatingMode,DW :
Shutdown,MA : Maintenance,UP :
Startup,DW : Shutdown;
• model elements have a variable defining
the number of modes of behavior that use
and an attribute defining the max num-
ber (generally 1);
• the dynamic model is only valid for a
given mode. In this mode, the connection
variables are carried out during the ac-
tivation step, and they are disconnected
during the desactivation phase.
Remark. Changing the functional mode for
an transforming activity type. When a change
mode occurs, if the transformation relation-
ship is not valid for this mode, this one is in-
terrupted and the elements being processed
(inputs and outputs) are destroyed. if we de-
sire specifying a simple abnormal transfor-
mation of inputs, it is sufficient to define the
activity as being valid for this mode, and to
specify in the dysfunctional model, that the
defects of the support element or the defects
associated with the function behavior pattern,
lead to a output default. For example, a de-
fault in a machine may product a defective
part, while maintaining the same behavior in
terms of machining.
4.1 Use for the simulation and diagnosis
The proposed meta model may be used to
structure the risk analysis, and to allow the
exploitation of the obtained information for
system simulation and diagnosis(Chittaro and
Ranon, 2004). For space reasons, we can
not give details here. A simulation approach
which uses the transformation of the FIS meta
model into High level Petri net may be found
in (Negrichi et al., 2012).
5 EXAMPLE OF APPLICATION
In this section, we will illustrate the behav-
ior of the system for transporting hazardous
materials by road. This system consists of
five functions: Loading of hazardous mate-
rials in a truck; Moving of the truck along a
given route; Waiting for the truck at various
points: parking, waiting for unloading at cus-
tomer or waiting for loading at supplier; truck
Unloading at customer; Storage at customer
or supplier. We will detail the Loading func-
tion. We will construct the structural, the dys-
functional and the evolution views. This func-
tion presents the Loading of hazardous ma-
terials (which is simulated in the form of
blocks) in a truck. To achieve such a load,
many entry attributes are required such as a
deposit, a machine, a worker and a truck, and
it needs as attributes outputs: a deposit, truck
and materials. The deposit and materials are
seen as modified resources. Loading will de-
crease the amount of materials contained in
the deposit and will change the positions of
contents. Deposit, truck, workman are seen
as supports for the Loading function, they are
reserved prior to loading and released at the
end. Figure 8 shows relations of Loading de-
scribing before.
Figure 8: Relations for Loading
To have a good load, we should take note
about time loading and the quality of loaded
products, and eliminate any incompatibilities
of products in the same expedition. A Load
failure may come from four cases (Flaus and
Granddamas, 2002)(Wirth et al., 1996) :
• delay of loading (unavailability of a de-
posit, truck, worker or machine);
• delay during loading (in case of unavail-
ability of the machine, materials can be
loaded manually but it may take much
time);
• a collision during loading which can af-
fect the quality of contents;
• and finally a bad loading represented by
an expedition of incompatible two prod-
ucts in the same truck.
Figure 9 shows the various failure modes of
loading describing a Fault tree (Karagiannis
et al., 2010) .
Figure 9: Fault tree for loading
Table 1 illustrates the evolution mode of
each situations. Our simulation allows the
system to evolve the basic events (basic
events Fault tree), and it describes the fail-
ure mode of the function. This failure mode
helps to obtain the behavior mode related to
each failure (Table 1), where each Fault tree
(Delay during loading, delay of loading, bad
loading and Accident) is carried by a behav-
ior mode evaluating the level of risk related to
each situation.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a method for
risk analysis including a specification of the
general process and her functions. For each
function, we have precised the inputs, the out-
puts, the required resources, a dysfunctional
model, and a model of evolution. The main
interest of this meta model is that it allows
the representation of risk analysis and dynam-
ical behavior in a coherent manner, which can
be used to perform various related tasks: risk
evaluation, diagnosis, simulation under de-
graded conditions, prognostics ...This was il-
lustrated through an example of loading haz-
ardous materials in a truck. One of our future
goals is to to simulate several times a complex
phenomenon of transportation of dangerous
goods, by using multi-agent based simulation
and to generate randomly risks via the Monte
Carlo simulation.
Table 1: Evolution mode of Load function
Model Behavior Related Equations
element mode Fault tree event
Loading Normal T = f(q, d) =
q
d
where T is the loading time,
q is the quantity to be loaded,
and d is the loading flow;
Loading Abnormal1 Delay of loading T = f(q, d) =
q
d
+ T1
where T1 time of unavailability of machine,
workers, depot, material or truck;
Loading Abnormal2 Delay during loading T = f(q1, d1) =
q1
d1 × n
where q1 is the quantity to be loaded,
d1 is the loading flow for one workers,
and n is the number of workers;
Loading Abnormal3 Bad loading
∆T
∆t
= F (T, ca, cb)
where ca is the concentration of product A,
cb is the concentration of product B,
and T is the environmental temperature;
Loading Abnormal4 Accident D = f(M,t)
where M is the material to be loaded,
and t is the temperature.
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